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Abstract. Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technique has been
widely accepted as wireless identification standard in the business world.
While RFID technique enables efficient collection of identification infor-
mation, it also introduces new security risk due to the emerging of RFID
malwares. This risk becomes increasingly severe due to the adoption of
internet in RFID applications (e.g., track and trace in EPCglobal net-
work) and the use of mobile devices as RFID readers. The prior work
to defend the threat of RFID malwares has mainly focused on the pro-
tection of front-end tag-reader communications and back-end database
systems. Less work has been conducted to defend against RFID malwares
in a systematic manner. In particular, no work has investigated RFID
malwares on mobile devices that are connected to the internet. In this
paper, we survey the state of the art in research on RFID and mobile
malwares. The major challenges are identified in the research. To de-
fend against RFID malwares on mobile devices, we propose an extended
threat model, a basic anti-malware framework, and a list of intrusion
detection techniques for future research.
1 Introduction
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a contactless automatic identification
and tracking technique, which has been widely accepted in the business world. As
the replacement of traditional barcodes, RFID makes it more efficient to gather
identification information about physical objects from a distance. On the other
hand, RFID malwares have been recently expected to become a severe threat to
RFID applications in the near future.
In the past, there used to be certain security myths about RFID malwares.
One myth is that the limited storage capacity of RFID tag will make any harm-
ful malware impossible to survive until one research team in Vrije University
provides the first proof-of-concept malware design [1]. Their work shows that a
harmful malware can be constructed without violating the capacity limitation of
RFID Tag. Making the situation worse, the capacity limitation of RFID tag has
been being relaxed with the development of IC techniques. Today, even some
low-cost RFID tags have enough storage to hold certain common PC malwares;
more powerful RFID tags will be emerging in the near future.
The new RFID standard, EPCglobal architecture 3 , aims to create a global
network for sharing RFID-related product information between trading partners.
To achieve high scalability and low cost, existing internet is used in EPCglobal
architecture as backbone. The inherent security issues in internet makes RFID
systems more vulnerable to malware attacks.
Due to the popularity of ubiquitous computing, integrating mobile devices
with RFID readers exhibits an emerging trend in RFID applications. The use
of mobile devices in RFID systems provides a flexible and efficient environment
for information access and maintenance, but it also introduces new challenges
for defending against RFID malwares.
The current research on RFID malwares has mainly focused on the protec-
tion of front-end tag-reader communications and back-end database systems.
Relatively less effort has been made towards defending RFID malwares in a
systematic manner. In particular, RFID malwares have not been investigated
for RFID applications based on EPCglobal architecture and mobile devices. To
facilitate research in this direction, we survey the state-of-the-art malwares for
RFID and mobile systems. The major challenges are identified for defending
against RFID malwares on mobile devices. To address the challenges, we pro-
pose an extended threat model, a basic anti-malware framework, and a list of
intrusion detection techniques for future research.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The security challenges for
defending against RFID malwares and mobile malwares are demonstrated in
Section 2 and Section 3, respectively. The basic framework for defending RFID
malwares on mobile devices is proposed in Section 4. Finally, a conclusion of this
paper is given in Section 5.
2 State-of-Art RFID Malwares
The first proof-of-concept RFID malware is proposed in 2006 by a research team
at Vrije University. The publication of their paper [1] triggers significant atten-
tion from the media, for it demonstrates that RFID malwares are realistically
feasible with limited resources of RFID tags. Since the physical limitations for
RFID malwares have been relaxed largely in latest RFID products, more RFID
malwares are expected to emerge in the near future. In this section, we sum-
marize various aspects of RFID malwares and the current countermeasures for
defending them.
2.1 Essence of RFID Malwares
Similar to the traditional PC malwares, RFID malwares exploit software vul-
nerabilities to make software work abnormally. Previously, RFID malwares were
considered impractical because RFID tags can only hold limited amount of data
(usually less than 1024 bits). Therefore, only the existing malwares that reside
3 EPCglobal architecture, http://www.epcglobalinc.org
in a small amount of data may be migrated to RFID scenarios. This requirement
made some people believe that RFID malwares attack was unrealistic.
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Fig. 1. Basic Threat Model for RFID Malwares
Figure 1 shows the basic threat model for RFID malwares given in [1]. Notice
that the infected RFID tags can be common tags with limited resources or more
powerful tags such as contactless smart cards. The basic threat model consists
of the following steps: 1) The infected RFID Tag first feeds the tag reader with
malicious data. 2) The malicious data are used to exploit the vulnerabilities
of RFID middleware or database system. 3) If the middleware or database is
successfully compromised, the malware can be spread by updating tag values
with malicious data during regular tag updating. They can also infect other
enterprise systems when they retrieve the malicious data from the database.
Three kinds of RFID malware attacks have been investigated before [1, 2]:
SQL Injection, Code Insertion, and Buffer Overflow. SQL Injection for RFID
is to encode malicious SQL fragments into tag values, which may hack into
the backend database system to modify the data columns related to regular tag
updating. Code Insertion to encode malicious script fragments into tag values,
which may launch attacks such as Server Side Includes and XSS when the RFID
system is managed by its administrator. Buffer Overflow is to feed tag readers
with data whose size is larger than the expected length. This may cause buffer
overflow as the middleware programmer may assume to process tag data of small
size.
In addition, EPCglobal architectureallows using the internet infrastructure
to achieve high scalability and cost-effectiveness for RFID middleware; therefore,
RFID systems in EPCglobal network inherit the existing security vulnerabilities
of the internet.
2.2 Capability of RFID Products
The major physical limitations for RFID malwares is the storage capacity of the
RFID tags. Since a large number of tags are usually used in commercial RFID
applications, the cost of RFID tag must be kept low to promote the adoption
of RFID techniques. To reduce the cost of RFID tag, the storage capacity of
RFID tags is limited to hundreds or thousands bits in the previous low-cost tag
products.
Table 1. Capability of Representative RFID Tags
Model Price per Tag ID EPC ID User Memory
tag (bit) (bit) (byte)
RI-UHF-00001-01a $0.09 32 96 N/A
Higgs-3b $0.40 32 96(up to 480) 64
FBT-7400c $5.00 (2006) Unknown Unknown 7.5K
LIME Tagd $50.00 (2007) 128 96 512K
a Texas Instruments, http://www.ti.com
b Alien Technique, http://www.alientechnology.com
c Intelleflex, http://www.intelleflex.com
d SecureRF, http://www.securerf.com
With the development of IC technology, certain low-cost tags that are newly
developed have relatively larger storage capacity that can even hold common
PC malwares. Table 1 gives the product information of typical RFID Tags.
The FBT-7400 tag has 7.5KB user memory and its price is only $5.00 per tag
two years ago. 4 Moreover, the storage capacity of RFID tag is expected to
keep increasing because this is essential to enable more applications of RFID
techniques. Another motivation is that the deployment of sophisticated security
mechanisms also demands large storage. In the near future, the storage capacity
of RFID tags should no longer be a major limitation for RFID malwares.
Table 2. Capability of Representative RFID Readers
Model Platform Interface RAM Flash
(byte) (byte)
ALR-9900 readera Linux, Java & .Net LAN TCP/IP, RS232 64M 64M
MC9090-G Windows Mobile 5.0 802.11a/b/g, 128M 64M
handheld readerb Bluetooth v1.2
UHF Interrogator Windows and Linux CF Type 1 N/A N/A
CF Cardc
a Alien Technique, http://www.alientechnology.com
b Motorola, http://www.motorola.com
c GAO RFID Inc, http://www.gaorfid.com
From the product information of typical RFID readers shown in Table 2,
we can see that most of the RFID readers work on mainstream platforms. The
RFID readers have become common peripheral devices for computer systems and
they can be considered as another wireless interface like Wi-Fi and Bluetooth.
The high integration of RFID devices with current computation environment
means RFID systems will not only enjoy the power but also suffer from the
vulnerabilities of the current computation environment.
4 Some of the prices are estimated from the old reports. The current prices should be
lower than the estimation. The publication year of those reports are labeled with
their prices.
2.3 Practices of RFID Malwares
We now examine two events related to RFID malwares. Although no all technical
details are available in the reports of the events, we can still learn valuable lessons
from these events.
Event 1: Announcement of first proof-of-concept RFID malware (2006)
Rieback, Crispo, and Tanenbaum proposed the first artificial SQL/Script
injection and buffer overflow examples together with a basic propagation model
for RFID malwares [1]. They figured out that the malicious data stored in a small
number of bits can be used to launch a SQL/Script injection attack that contains
short malicious commands such as system shutdown. The RFID malware can
be propagated by modifying the backend database for many tag values. Their
malwares are experimented on an artificial RFID system with 256 KB Texas
Instruments ISO-15693 compliant RFID tags. Their malwares require insecure
database configuration which should be easy to prevent in practice.
Lesson 1: It is enough to construct a RFID malware with the malicious data
stored in a small number of bits without violating the capacity limitation of a
RFID tag. RFID malwares can spread itself by modifying the backend database
for many tag values.
Event 2: Cracking of RFID enabled e-passport system (2007)
Lukas Grunwald started his cracking work for RFID systems in 2006. He
has shown how to clone, extract, and modify information of RFID enabled e-
passport in the top hacker conference defcon-14 in 2006 5. It took only weeks
to forge an e-passport with his technique. This attack can be applied to any
country’s e-passport systems that adhere to the same International Civil Avia-
tion Organization (ICAO) standard in the case that the access key printed on
a passport page can be read. In 2007, he showed how to construct a malicious
JPEG2000 image file that contains an e-passport photo to crash RFID mid-
dleware by exploiting the buffer overflow vulnerability in an off-the-shelf JPEG
library 6. Although the JPEG data is protected with digital signature, an at-
tacker is still able to crash the system by loading malicious data. It is suggested
that the vendors should choose off-the-shelf software/library carefully to avoid
common vulnerabilities. Since the e-passport system is critically important for
national security, many security experts claimed that RFID is the wrong type
of technology for personal identification.
Lesson 2: Data level protection mechanisms such as encryption and integrity
checking may not provide complete protection against RFID malwares. We need
more sophisticated system level protection against RFID malwares.
2.4 Academic Research on RFID Malwares
The prior research on RFID malwares is based on the basic threat model pro-
posed in [1]. The first work in this area [1] demonstrated the basic design prin-
ciples for RFID malwares that exploit SQL-Injection and Server Side Including
5 Defcon, http://www.defcon.org
6 E-passport, http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2007/08/epassport
vulnerabilities. More examples for RFID malwares, including a simple buffer
overflow attack, are provided in [2]. Sulaiman, Mukkamala, and Sung [3] re-
ported platform test results for SQL Injection attacks in RFID systems. They
[4] also proposed a new attack paradigm called fragmentation attack to break the
capacity limitation for RFID malwares. In this paradigm, an RFID malware can
be decomposed into multiple fragments that can be stored into resource-limited
tags; the fragments can later be combined to form a functional malware under
certain conditions so as to attack a target system. Recently, Rotter [5] analyzed
the security and privacy risks of RFID systems in a systematic manner. However,
none of the previous work on RFID malwares addresses the security challenges
of adopting EPCglobal standards and mobile devices in RFID applications.
Among many working groups on RFID Security, it is worthwhile to mention
MIT Auto-ID Lab 7and RFID CUSP (i.e., RFID ConsortiUm for Security and
Privacy) 8.
2.5 Industrial Efforts against RFID Malwares
Many companies run business on RFID security, eleven of which formed an
alliance called “RFID Security Alliance” 9. Most of the companies on RFID se-
curity commit themselves to anti-cloning and anti-counterfeiting of RFID tags,
while one company, NeoCatena Networks, Inc. 10provides anti-malware solutions
for RFID systems. The security suite of NeoCatena Networks consists of three
components, RF-Audit, RF-Wall, and RF-Manager. RF-Audit is a network mon-
itor that analyzes network events to detect denial of service attacks and triggers
early alarms for unexpected RFID network traffic. RF-Wall provides network
security with RFID data encryption and digital signatures. RF-Manager is a
management interface for the security suite. To defend against malware attacks,
the security suite employs two techniques: one is content and format validation
for tag data, and the other is pattern-based RFID traffic analysis.
Figure 2 provides an overview of the RFID malware countermeasures used
in current industrial products. Due to the resource limitation of RFID tags,
the computationally intense operations in performing the countermeasures are
assigned to middleware or back-end systems. Current anti-malware solutions
mainly focus on protecting middleware and backend database systems, more
work needs to be done to protect front-end devices such as (mobile) RFID read-
ers. Systematic solution is needed to guarantee security for every component in
RFID systems.
3 State-of-Art Mobile Malwares
The first proof-of-concept mobile malware “Cabir” is proposed in 2004 by a virus
writer named Vallez, a member of international group of virus writers known as
7 MIT Auto-ID Labs, http://autoid.mit.edu
8 RFID CUSP, http://www.rfid-cusp.org
9 RFID Security Alliance, http://www.rfidsa.com
10 NeoCatena Networks, Inc, http://www.neocatena.com
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Fig. 2. Common countermeasures in industrial products
29A. This event was said to lift the curtain on a new era of mobile malwares 11.
However, the past four years didn’t see any major outbreak of mobile malwares.
Until now, the total number of mobile malwares is known to be hundreds, which
is small if compared to millions of PC malwares 12. Nonetheless, the popularity
of smart phones and other mobile devices open up new opportunities for mobile
malwares.
3.1 Vulnerabilities on Mobile Devices
The vulnerabilities on mobile devices can be classified into two categories: (i)
Basic implementation errors or design flaws. This type of vulnerabilities usually
results from improper assumptions on input parameters or program behaviors.
For example, unrecognized codes in SMS and Caller ID may crash certain mobile
phones. Insecure exception handlers for hardware failures may also be exploited
by mobile malwares. (ii) Lack of permission control. Most mobile systems are
single-user systems, where each process on a mobile device runs in a high privi-
lege. Once a mobile malware is launched on such device, it can do anything in a
high privilege if it is not explicitly forbidden by the mobile OS. To address this
problem, the permission protection mechanism for system files is available, but
only at v9 and above in the latest Symbian OS. Figure 3 shows the distribution of
software vulnerabilities on mobile systems in CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures) database 13. It can be observed that Symbian has less vulnerabilities
than Windows Mobile and iphone.
The mobile malware attacks can be categorized into: (i) Denial of service,
which crashes mobile phone and reboots it. Most of proof-of-concept denial of
service attacks exploit the codes available on the internet. An advanced form of
this attack uses Trojan horses to launch distributed denial of service for some
specific phone numbers [6]. (ii) Destruction, which deletes system files or user
data. The destruction attacks may be common for Mobile OS without permis-
sion protection for critical files. (iii) Information stealing, which forwards user
11 Viruslist, www.viruslist.com/en/analysis?pubid=200119916
12 Symantec, http://www.symantec.com/business/theme.jsp?themeid=threatreport
13 CVE database, http://cve.mitre.org
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Fig. 3. The distribution of software vulnerabilities on mobile systems
data by SMS/MMS/Email without user prompt, or opens a backdoor for hacker
[6]. Mobile malwares can be propagated through all available communication
measures including SMS, MMS, Email, Blue Tooth, Wi-Fi, Flash Card, even
RFID.
Nowadays, a barrier for mobile malwares to propagate is that user interac-
tion must be involved for those non-crash-purpose malwares. None of today’s
mobile malwares can install themselves without the users accepting the stan-
dard security warnings14. Social engineering techniques, such as pretending to
be a theme, a system patch, or a game installation, are widely used to tempt
users to run malwares on mobile systems. The latest cell-phone malwares report
from F-Secure as shown in Figure 4 indicates that 364 out of 373 malwares are
designed for the most popular mobile OS, Symbian (57.1% market share in Q2
2008), which however has only three vulnerability records in the CVE database.
All infection involves user download.
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3.2 Malware Trend on Mobile Systems
The phenomenon that there has been no major mobile malware breaks can be
explained by the following reasons:
14 Mikko Hypponen: Mobile Malware. Invited talk at the 16th USENIX Security Sym-
posium, Boston, 2007. http://www.usenix.org/events/sec07/tech/
– Most mobile devices have limited functions that do not support installing
many user softwares. Even if the installation is supported, mobile malwares
may not be installed without user interactions.
– Most mobile devices cannot provide enough network capability to support
the internet connection that is necessary for malware propagation. Only
local propagations of mobile malwares are allowed through Bluetooth in
most cases.
– Most people only use the phone or email functions of mobile devices such
that infecting mobile devices may not lead to high potential profit.
However, this situation may change due to the fast development of mobile
technology. With the popularity of smart phones, the device functionality may
no longer be a limitation for propagating mobile malwares. Wi-Fi has been in-
corporated in the latest mobile devices, which allows malwares to obtain stabler
and faster connections to the internet. Many people, including businessmen and
college students, get used to storing sensitive or private data on their mobile
devices. All these new trends inspire strong motivations for attackers to launch
mobile malware attacks.
3.3 Academic Research on Mobile Malwares
Academic research on mobile malwares has focuses on investigating malware
propagation and malware detection. For malware propagation, many stochas-
tic models are proposed to characterize malware propagation behavior through
Bluetooth or SMS/MMS [7–11]. On the other hand, the malware detection re-
search can be considered as an extension of the malware detection on the PC
platform. The solution is similar to the signature-based detection, which is ad-
justed for resource-constrained mobile computation environment.
Bose and Shin [6] provided a survey of mobile malwares from 2004, the first
year when mobile malware was reported, to 2006, the year when the paper was
published. The basic malware signatures provided in Bose and Shin’s work is still
valuable for today’s mobile malwares. A high-level signature detection scheme
is introduced later for mobile device based on the malware detection approach
on PC platform [12]. In addition, Cheng et al. [13] presented a firewall solution
between cellular network and internet to filter malicious data transferal.
3.4 Industrial Efforts against Mobile Malwares
Most anti-virus vendors offer the mobile versions of their anti-virus softwares.
However, their solutions may not work extremely well due to the following rea-
sons: (i) Limited resources are available on mobile devices for anti-virus softwares
to consume. (ii) Timely update on anti-virus softwares may be guaranteed since
internet connection is not always available on mobile devices. (iii) Social en-
gineering attacks may tempt users to skip the warnings provided by anti-virus
softwares. Once malwares are launched, anti-virus softwares could be neutralized
due to poor runtime privilege control on mobile systems. The conclusion is that
anti-virus softwares on mobile devices are not mature and the current mobile
anti-virus solutions are useful mostly for post-infection cleanup [12].
4 Anti-Malware Framework for RFID Systems with
Mobile Devices
The threats of RFID malwares will become more immediate and severe in the
near future due to the following two reasons. First, RFID systems will be widely
deployed in business and industry (e.g., supply chain management, electronic
payment, and access control). The high return on breaking such systems (e.g.,
forging credit cards and e-passports) will motivate attackers to launch attacks.
The internet connections provided in EPCglobal network may facilitate the prop-
agation of RFID malwares. The resource limitations for RFID malwares will be
relaxed in new RFID tags due to the fast development of IC technology. Second,
the integration of RFID readers and mobile devices opens more vulnerabilities
for RFID malwares than their non-portable readers. The limited resources on
mobile devices prohibit sophisticate anti-virus mechanisms from migrated from
PC platform to mobile devices. To mitigate these threats, systematic solution
should be designed to protect every component in RFID systems. In this sec-
tion, we propose an extended threat model for RFID malwares, and then discuss
anti-malware solutions for RFID systems with mobile readers.
4.1 Extended Threat Model
We extend the basic threat model proposed in [1] by including mobile devices
and EPCglobal network (See Figure 5). The whole RFID system is partitioned
into three domains: EPC core domain, company domain, and public domain. The
EPC core domain contains the EPCglobal network, which should be maintained
under the most strict security policies to establish trust among multiple involving
parties. The company domain contains mobile devices, middleware, edge servers,
and enterprise database systems. The company domain encapsulates business
logic in RFID applications. The public domain contains RFID readers and tags,
which is the weakest link in terms of information security. The malicious data
carried by RFID tags can be malware entities, malware triggers, or malware
fragments that can be later re-assembled into malware entities or triggers.
4.2 Anti-Malware Architecture for RFID Systems with Mobile
Devices
To provide systematic protection for RFID systems with mobile devices, we pro-
pose to arm the mobile devices with an intrusion prevention system (IPS) and an
intrusion detection system (IDS). Figure 6 shows this anti-malware architecture.
The IPS system works as a firewall on RFID readers and mobile devices
that can monitor RFID traffics sending between RFID tags and middlewares. It
checks the format and content according to RFID data specifications so as to
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defend against DoS attack, SQL/Script injection, and shell code in text input.
The IPS system may also check digital signatures of RFID data so as to prevent
unexpected crash caused by loading malicious data payload.
Since the IPS system cannot filter out all malware attacks due to the con-
straint of limited resources at RFID readers and mobile devices, the remaining
protection is handled by the IDS system. The IDS system will detect RFID
malwares by monitoring the track between mobile device and edge server. The
purpose is to thwart unexpected attacks such as buffer overflow attacks. A sig-
nificant challenge for deploying IDS system on mobile devices is how to make
the IDS system practical on resource-limited mobile devices. The IDS solutions
developed for PC platforms cannot be directly applied on mobile devices since
such IDS solutions are mostly resource demanding.
4.3 Potential Techniques for Practical IDS on Mobile Devices
To address the challenges of deploying IDS on mobile devices against RFID
malwares, we discuss some potential pratical techniques for future study. The
first technique is good signature checking. The huge size of signature database is
the major obstacle for IDS system to achieve practical performance on limited
resources. In traditional signature-based solutions on PC platform, it is common
to query a signature database with a half million records, each characterizing a
malware’s behavior. The complex program behaviors on PC platform make it
difficult, if not impossible, to maintain signatures for malware-free programs. For
convenience, we call the signatures for malware-free programs “good signatures.”
Considering that the functionalities of RFID readers on mobile devices are much
simpler than general purpose PC systems, it is practically meaningful to use good
signatures to detect RFID malwares on mobile devices.
The good signature based checking may have the following problems. The
first problem is how to automatically generate efficient good signatures? Many
related researches have been conducted for extracting behavior signatures by
machine learning and static program analysis; however, most programs are still
be analyzed manually by anti-virus experts. The second problem is how to se-
cure the good signature database and IDS monitor? The latest mobile OS is
still a single-user system, which provides little protection for IDS software. The
IDS software may be neutralized once certain RFID malwares have chances to
run. Some runtime privilege control mechanisms should be proposed to augment
mobile OSs.
Another potential technique is cooperative mode. Since internet connection is
guaranteed in EPCglobal network, it is not necessary for mobile devices to work
alone in RFID systems. The mobile devices can shift part or all of the intrusion
detection workload to cooperative servers, which can leverage on more resources
to alleviate the bottleneck of RFID firewall on mobile devices.
The cooperative mode technique may have the following problems. First,
which portion of IDS workload should be shifted to cooperative servers? This
portion of workload should be determined carefully so as to guarantee both good-
enough security and practically efficient performance. One possible solution is to
dynamically adjust the work load to avoid the mobile device or any cooperative
server from becoming the performance bottleneck. Another problem is how to
cope with the situation in which the connection to the cooperative server is lost?
It is possible that an attacker launches a DoS attack and blocks the communi-
cation channel between the mobile device and its cooperative server. The most
conservative response is to stop any transactions, roll back to a pervious secure
point, and report the event by certain backup channels. An alternative way is
to process the safe transactions only that the mobile device can decide itself.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we survey the state-of-the-art malwares and countermeasures for
RFID systems and mobile systems. We propose an extended threat model to
capture the malwares threats to RFID systems with mobile devices. We also
discuss some potential techniques to defend against malware threats to RFID
systems with mobile devices. In the future, we will deepen our analysis on RFID
malwares and provide more technical details on anti-malware solutions.
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